Voting can abstractly model any decision-making scenario and as such it has been extensively studied over the decades. Recently, the related literature has focused on quantifying the impact of utilizing only limited information in the voting process on the societal welfare for the outcome, by bounding the distortion of voting rules. Even though there has been significant progress towards this goal, all previous works have so far neglected the fact that in many scenarios (like presidential elections) voting is actually a distributed procedure. In this paper, we consider a setting in which the voters are partitioned into disjoint districts and vote locally therein to elect local winning alternatives using a voting rule; the final outcome is then chosen from the set of these alternatives. We prove tight bounds on the distortion of well-known voting rules for such distributed elections both from a worst-case perspective as well as from a best-case one. Our results indicate that the partition of voters into districts leads to considerably higher distortion, a phenomenon which we also experimentally showcase using real-world data.
Introduction
In a decision-making scenario, the task is to aggregate the opinions of a group of different people into a common decision. This process is often distributed, in the sense that smaller groups first reach an agreement, and then the final outcome is determined based on the options proposed by each such group. This can be due to scalability issues (e.g., it is hard to coordinate a decision between a very large number of participants), due to different roles of the groups (e.g., when each group represents a country in the European Union), or simply due to established institutional procedures (e.g., electoral systems).
For example, in the US presidential elections 1 , the voters in each of the 50 states cast their votes within their regional district, and each state declares a winner; the final winner is taken as the one that wins a weighted plurality vote over the state winners, with the weight of each state being proportional to its size. Another example is the Eurovision Song Contest 2 , where each participating country holds a local voting process (consisting of a committee vote and an Internet vote from the people of the country) and then assigns points to the 10 most popular options, on a 1-12 scale (with 11 and 9 omitted). The winner of the competition is the participant with the most total points.
The foundation of utilitarian economics, which originated near the end of the 18th century, revolves around the idea that the outcome of a decision making process should be one that maximizes the wellbeing of the society, which is typically captured by the notion of the social welfare. A fundamental question that has been studied extensively in the related literature is whether the rules that are being used for decision making actually achieve this goal, or to what extend they fail to do so. This motivates the following question: What is the effect of distributed decision making on the social welfare?
The importance of this investigation is highlighted by the example of the 2016 US presidential election [Wikipedia, 2016] . While 48.2% of the US population (that participated in the election) viewed Hillary Clinton as the best candidate, Donald Trump won the election with only 46.1% of the popular vote. This was due to the district-based electoral system, and the outcome would have been different if there was a single pool of voters instead. A similar phenomenon occurred in the 2000 presidential election as well, when Al Gore won the popular vote, but George W. Bush was elected president.
Our setting and contribution
For concreteness, we use the terminology of voting as a proxy for any distributed decision-making scenario. A set of voters are called to vote on a set of alternatives through a district-based election. In other words, the set of voters is partitioned into districts and each district holds a local election, following some voting rule. The winners of the local elections are then aggregated into the single winner of the general election. Note that this setting models many scenarios of interest, such as those highlighted in the above discussion.
We are interested in the effect of the distributed nature of the election on the social welfare of the voters (the sum of their valuations for the chosen outcome). Typically, this effect is quantified by the notion of distortion [Procaccia and Rosenschein, 2006] , which is defined as the worst-case ratio between the maximum social welfare for any of the outcomes and the social welfare for the outcome chosen through voting. Concretely, we are interested in bounding the distortion of voting rules for district-based elections.
We consider three cases when it comes to the district partition:
• symmetric districts, in which every district has the same number of voters and contributes the same weight to the final outcome,
• unweighted districts, in which the weight is still the same, but the sizes of the districts may vary, and finally
• unrestricted districts, where the sizes and the weights of the districts are unconstrained.
For each of these cases, we show upper and lower bounds on the distortion of voting rules, under standard assumptions. First, in Section 3, we consider general voting rules (which might have access to the numerical valuations of the voters) and provide distortion guarantees for any voting rule as a function of the worstcase distortion of the voting rule when applied to a single district. As a corollary, we obtain distortion bounds for Range Voting, i.e., the rule that outputs the alternative that maximizes the social welfare, and prove that this mechanism is optimal among all voting rules for the problem. Then, in Section 4, we consider ordinal rules and provide a general lower bound on the distortion of any such rule. For the widely-used Plurality voting rule, we provide tight distortion bounds, proving that it is asymptotically the best ordinal voting rule in terms of distortion. In Section 5, we provide experiments based on real data to evaluate the distortion on "average case" and "average worst case" district partitions. Finally, in Section 6, we explore whether districting (i.e., manually partitioning the voters into districts in the best-way possible) can allow to recover the winner of Plurality or Range Voting in the election without districts. We conclude with possible avenues for future work in Section 7.
Related Work
The distortion framework was first proposed by Procaccia and Rosenschein [2006] and subsequently it was adopted by a series of papers; for instance, see [Anshelevich et al., 2018; Anshelevich and Postl, 2017; Benade et al., 2017; Bhaskar et al., 2018; Boutilier et al., 2015; Caragiannis et al., 2017; FilosRatsikas and Miltersen, 2014] . The original idea of the distortion measure was to quantify the loss in performance due to the lack of information, meaning how well can an ordinal voting rule (that has access only to the preference orderings induced by the numerical values of the voters) can approximate the cardinal objective. In our paper, the distortion will be attributed to two factors: always the fact that the election is being done in districts, and possibly also the fact that the voting rules employed are ordinal. Our setting follows closely that of Boutilier et al. [2015] and Caragiannis et al. [2017] , with the novelty of introducing district-based elections and measuring their distortion. The worst-case distortion bounds of voting rules in the absence of districts can be found in the aforementioned papers.
The ill effects of district-based elections have been highlighted in a series of related articles, mainly revolving around the issue of gerrymandering [Schuck, 1987] , that is, the systematic manipulation of the geographical boundaries of an electoral constituency in favor of a particular political party. The effects of gerrymandering have been studied in the related literature before [Borodin et al., 2018; Cohen-Zemach et al., 2018; Lev and Lewenberg, 2019] , but never in relation to the induced distortion of the elections. While our district partitions are not necessarily geographically-based, our worst-case bounds capture the potential effects of gerrymandering on the deterioration of the social welfare. Other works on districtbased elections and distributed decision-making include [Bachrach et al., 2016; Erdélyi et al., 2015] .
Related to our results in Section 6 is the paper by Lewenberg et al. [2017] , where the authors explore the effects of districting with respect to the winner of Plurality, when ballot boxes are placed on the real plane, and voters are partitioned into districts based on their nearest ballot box. The extra constraints imposed by the geological nature of the districts in their setting leads to an NP-hardness result for the districting problem, whereas for our unconstrained (other than being symmetric) districts, we prove that making the Plurality winner the winner of the general election is always possible in polynomial time. In contrast, the problem becomes NP-hard when we are interested in the winner of Range Voting instead of Plurality.
Preliminaries
A general election E is defined as a tuple (M, N , D, w, v, f ), where
• M is a set of m alternatives;
• N is a set of n voters;
• D is a set of k districts, with district d ∈ D containing n d voters such that d∈D n d = n (i.e., the districts define a partition of the set of voters);
• v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is a valuation profile for the n voters, where v i = (v ij ) j∈M contains the valuation of voter i for all alternatives, and V n is the set of all such valuation profiles;
• f = (f d ) d∈D is a set of voting rules (one for each district), where f d : V n d → M is a map of valuation profiles with n d voters to alternatives.
For each voter i ∈ N , we denote by d(i) the district she belongs to. For each district d ∈ D, a local or district election between its members takes place, and the winner of this election is the alternative
where 1 {X} is equal to 1 if the event X is true, and 0 otherwise. In simple words, the winner j(E) of the general election is the alternative with the highest weighted approval score, breaking ties arbitrarily.
For example, when all weights are 1, j(E) is the alternative that wins the most local elections.
Following the standard convention, we adopt the unit-sum representation of valuations, according to which j∈M v ij = 1 for every voter i ∈ N . For a given valuation profile v, the social welfare of alternative j ∈ M is defined as the total value the agents have for her:
Throughout the paper, we assume that the same voting rule is applied in every local election (possibly for a different number of voters though, depending on how the districts are defined); we denote this voting rule by f and also let f (v) to be the alternative that is chosen by f when the voters have the valuation profile v.
The distortion of a voting rule f in a local election with η voters is defined as the worst-case ratio, over all possible valuation profiles of the voters participating in that election, between the maximum social welfare of any alternative and the social welfare of the alternative chosen by the voting rule:
The distortion of a voting rule f in a general election is defined as the worst-case ratio, over all possible general elections E that use f as the voting rule within the districts, between the maximum social welfare of any alternative and the social welfare of the alternative chosen by the general election:
Again, in simple words, the distortion of a voting rule f is the worst-case over all the possible valuations that voters can have and over all possible ways of partitioning these voters into districts. When k = 1, we recover the standard definition of the distortion. Next, we define some standard properties of voting rules.
Definition 2.1 (Properties of voting rules). A voting rule f is
• ordinal, if the outcome only depends on the preference orderings induced by the valuations and not the actual numerical values themselves. Formally, given a valuation profile v, let Π v be the ordinal preference profile formed by the values of the agents for the alternatives (assuming some fixed tie-breaking rule). A voting rule is ordinal if for any two valuation profiles v and v such that
• unanimous, if whenever all agents agree on an alternative, that alternative gets elected. Formally, whenever there exists an alternative a ∈ M for whom v ia ≥ v ij for all voters i ∈ N and all alternatives j ∈ M, then f (v) = a.
• (strictly) Pareto efficient, if whenever all agents agree that an alternative a is better than b, then b can not be elected instead of a.
Remark. It is not hard to see that we can assume that the best voting rule in terms of distortion is Pareto efficient, without loss of generality. Indeed, for any voting rule f that is not Pareto efficient, we can construct the following Pareto efficient rule f : for every input on which f outputs a Pareto efficient alternative, f outputs the same alternative; for every input on which f outputs an alternative that is not Pareto efficient, f outputs a maximal Pareto improvement, that is, a Pareto efficient alternative which all voters (weakly) prefer more than the alternative chosen by f . Clearly, f is Pareto efficient and achieves a social welfare at least as high as f . Note also that Pareto efficiency implies anonymity, so we will be using both properties in our proofs without loss of generality. Finally, most of the voting rules that are being employed in practice are ordinal, with the notable exception of Range Voting, which is the voting rule that outputs the alternative that maximizes the social welfare.
We consider the following three basic cases for the general elections, depending on the size and the weight of the districts:
• Symmetric Elections: all districts consist of n/k voters and have the same weight, i.e., n d = n/k and
• Unweighted Elections: all districts have the same weight, but not necessarily the same number of voters, i.e.,
• Unrestricted Elections: there are no restrictions on the sizes and weights of the districts.
Of course, the class of symmetric elections is a subclass of that of unweighted elections which in turn is a subclass of the class of unrestricted elections.
The effect of districts for general voting rules
Our aim in this section is to showcase the immediate effect of using districts to distributively aggregate votes. To this end, we present tight bounds on the distortion of all voting rules in a general election. We will first state a general theorem relating the distortion gdist(f ) of any general election that uses a voting rule f for the local elections, with the distortion dist(f ) of the voting rule.
Theorem 3.1. Let f be a voting rule with dist(f ) = γ. Then, the distortion gdist(f ) of f in the general election is
Proof. We prove the first two parts together, and the third one separately.
Parts (i) and (ii)
. Consider a general unweighted election E with a set M of m alternatives, a set N of n voters, a set D of k districts such that each district d consists of n d voters (if the election is symmetric, then n d = n/k) and has weight w d = 1. Let v be the valuation profile consisting of the valuations of all voters for all alternatives. Let a = j(E) be the winner of the election and denote by A ⊆ D the set of districts in which a wins according to f . Then, we have that
By the unit-sum assumption we have that
Since a is the winner in the districts of A according to f , and f has distortion at most γ, it must be the case that i:
Let b be the optimal alternative, and let B ⊂ D be the set of districts in which b is the winner. We split the social welfare of b into three parts:
We can now make the following observations:
• Since a wins in the districts of A according to f , the first part is at most γ · i:
• Since the value of each voter in B for b is by definition at most 1, the second part is at most
2 , as otherwise, f would have distortion larger than γ. As a result, the third part is at most
• Since a is the election winner, |B| ≤ |A| and |A| ≥ 1.
Putting all of these together, we upper-bound the social welfare of b as follows:
Hence, by (1), (2) and (3), we obtain
The proof of part (ii) is now complete. For part (i), we get the desired bound of γ + γmk 2 by simply setting min d∈D n d = max d∈D n d = n/k.
Part (iii).
Observe that the proof of part (iii) does not follow directly from the proof of part (ii) since now that the districts may have arbitrary weights, the number of districts that the election winner a wins does not need to be higher than the number of districts in which b is the winner. In other words, it might be the case that |B| > |A|. However, since |A| ≥ 1, inequality (2) can be simplified to
For the optimal alternative b we can also simplify our arguments by using the trivial fact that all voters not in districts of A have by definition value at most 1 for b. Then, we obtain
By combining (1), (4) and (5), we finally have that
This completes the proof.
We now turn to concrete voting rules and consider perhaps the most natural such rule: Range Voting (RV).
Definition 3.2 (Range Voting (RV)). Given a valuation profile v = (v 1 , ..., v η ) with η voters, Range Voting elects the alternative that maximizes the social welfare of the voters.
Note that the rule is both unanimous and Pareto efficient. Immediately from the definition of the rule and Theorem 3.1, we have the following corollary. 
We continue by presenting matching lower bounds on the distortion of any voting rule in a general election. The high-level idea in the proof of the following theorem is that the election winner is chosen arbitrarily among the alternatives with equal weight, which might lead to the cardinal information within the districts to be lost. 
Proof. We prove the first two parts together and the third one separately.
Parts (i) and (ii).
Consider an unweighted general election with a set of districts D = {d 1 , ..., d k } such that m > k and district d consists of n voters for ∈ [k] . Suppose that the valuations of the voters are such that there are k different district winners {a, b, c 3 , ..., c k }. Then, without loss of generality, the election winner is one of these alternatives; let a be the winner. Let ε ∈ (0, 1). We define the following valuation profile v:
• all voters in district d 1 have value 1/m + ε for a and 1/m − ε m−1 for every other alternative;
• all voters in district d 2 have value 1 for b and 0 for everyone else;
• all voters in district d for ≥ 3 have value 1/2 + ε for c , 1/2 − ε for b and 0 for everyone else.
Note that since the voting rule is unanimous without loss of generality, the winner of the first district is a, the winner of the second district is b and the winner of district d for ≥ 3 is c .
The optimal alternative is b with
while the winner of the election a has SW(a|v) = 1 m + ε n 1 .
As ε tends to zero, the ratio SW(b)/SW(a) becomes
The bounds follow by setting n 1 = min d∈D n d and n 2 = max d∈D n d for unweighted elections, and n 1 = n 2 = n/k for symmetric elections.
Part (iii).
For the unrestricted case, consider a general election such that there is a district d * ∈ D with weight w d * > d∈D\{d * } w d . Since d * has so much weight, the winner of this district is also the election winner. Let a and b be two distinguished alternatives, and ε ∈ (0, 1). We define the following valuation profile v:
• all voters in district d * have value 1/m + ε for a and 1/m − ε m−1 for every other alternative;
• all voters in each district d ∈ D \ {d * } have value 1 for b and 0 for everyone else.
Since the voting rule is unanimous without loss of generality, a is the winner in district d * and b is the winner in every other district. The optimal alternative is b with
while the election winner is alternative a with
and the proof follows by setting n d * = min d∈D n d .
Ordinal voting rules and Plurality
Although Range Voting is quite natural, its documented drawback is that it requires a very detailed informational structure from the voters, making the elicitation process rather complicated. For this reason, most voting rules that have been applied in practice are ordinal (see Theorem 2.1), as such rules present the voters with the much less demanding task of reporting a preference ordering over the alternatives, rather than actual numerical values. Thus, a very meaningful question, from a practical point of view, is "What is the distortion of ordinal voting rules?" The most widely used such rule is Plurality Voting. Besides its simplicity, the importance of this voting rule also comes from the fact that it is used extensively in practice. For instance, it is used in presidential elections in a number of countries like the USA and the UK. It is known that the distortion dist(PV) of Plurality Voting is O(m 2 ) [Caragiannis et al., 2017] . Therefore, if we plug-in this number to our general bound in Theorem 3.1, we obtain corresponding upper bounds for PV. However, in the following we obtain much better bounds, taking advantage of the structure of the mechanism; these bounds are actually tight. Proof. We the upper and the lower bounds separately, starting with the former.
Upper bounds. Consider a general unweighted election E with a set M of m alternatives, a set N of n voters, a set D of k districts such that each district d consists of n d voters and has weight w d = 1. Let v be the valuation profile consisting of the valuations of all voters for all alternatives, which induces the ordinal preference profile Π v . To simplify our discussion, let N d (j) be the set of voters in district d that rank alternative j in the first position, and also set
Let a = j(E) be the winner of the election and denote by A ⊆ D the set of districts in which a wins according to PV. Then, we have that
Since a has the plurality of votes in each district d ∈ A, we have that n d (a) ≥ n d (j) for every j ∈ M, and by the fact that
m . Similarly, for each agent i ∈ N d (a) we have that v ia ≥ v ij for every j ∈ M, and by the unit-sum assumption, we obtain that v ia ≥ 1 m . We also have that d∈A n d ≥ |A| · min d∈D n d . Hence,
Let b the optimal alternative, and denote by B ⊂ D the set of districts in which b is the winner. We split the social welfare of b into three parts:
We will now bound each term individually. First consider a district d ∈ A. Then, the welfare of the agents in d for b can be written as
Since a is the favourite alternative of every agent i ∈ N d (a), v ib ≤ v ia . By definition, the value of every agent i ∈ N d (b) for b is at most 1. The value of every agent i ∈ N d (a) ∪ N d (b) for b can be at most 1/2 since otherwise b would definitely be the favourite alternative of such an agent. Combining these observations, we get
where the second inequality follows by considering the value of all agent in d for alternative a, while the third inequality follows by the fact that a wins b by plurality. By summing over all districts in A, we can bound the first term of (8) as follows:
For the second term of (8), by definition we have that the value of each agent in the districts of B for alternative b can be at most 1, and therefore
For the third term of (8), observe that the total value of the agents in a district d ∈ A ∪ B for b must be at most 3 4 n d ; otherwise b would necessarily be ranked first in strictly more than half of the agents' preferences and therefore win in the district. Hence,
By substituting the bounds for the three terms of (8), as well as by taking into account the facts that |B| ≤ |A| and |A| ≥ 1, we can finally upper-bound the social welfare of b as follows:
By (6), (7) and (10), we can upper-bound the distortion of PV as follows:
This completed the proof of part (ii). For part (i), we get the desired bound of 1 + 3m 2 k 4 by simply setting
For part (iii), Since |A| ≥ 1, we simplify inequality (7) to
For the optimal alternative b we also simplify our arguments by using the trivial fact that all agents not in districts of A have by definition value at most 1 for b. Then, by also using inequality (9), we obtain
By combining (6), (11) and (12), we finally have that
This completes the proof of the upper bounds.
Lower bounds. We now provide matching lower bounds. For unweighted districts, consider a general election with a set of districts D = {d 1 , ..., d k } such that m > k, district d consists of n agents for ∈ [k], and n 1 is a multiple of m. We enumerate the alternatives as M = {j 1 , ..., j m }. Suppose that the agent preferences are such that there are k different district winners {a, b, c 3 ..., c k }, where a = j m−1 and b = j m . Then, one of these alternatives is selected as the election winner.
We define the approval votes and the valuation profile v of the voters as follows:
• The voters in district d 1 are split into m sets S 1 , ..., S m of size n 1 /m each such that the voters of set S i approve alternative j i . Since PV is Pareto efficient, we can assume without loss of generality that the winner in this district is a. The valuations are such that the voters in set S i for i ∈ [m − 2] have value 1/2 for j i and b, the voters in set S m−1 have value 1/m for all alternatives, and the voters in set S m have value 1 for b.
• The voters in district d 2 all approve alternative b and have value 1 for her.
• The voters in district d for ≥ 3 are split into two set of equal size n /2 such that the voters in the first set approve alternative c and the voters in the second set approve b. The voters in the first set have value 1/2 for both c and b, while the voters in the second set have value 1 for b.
while the winner of the election a has
Therefore, the distortion is equal to
The bound follows by selecting n 1 = min d∈D n d and n 2 = max d∈D n d . For part (i), we simply set n 1 = n 2 = n/k.
For the unrestricted case, consider a general election with k districts such that there is a district d * ∈ D with weight w d * > d∈D\{d * } w d . Since d * has so much weight, the winner of this district is the election winner as well. We enumerate the alternatives as M = {c 1 , ..., c m−2 , a, b}. We define the approval votes and the valuation profile v of the agents as follows: We assume without loss of generality that the winner in this district is a (since PV is Pareto efficient).
• District d ∈ D \ {d * }: all voters approve b and have value 1 for her.
The proof follows by selecting n d * = min d∈D n d .
Our next theorem shows that PV is asymptotically the best possible voting rule among all (deterministic) ordinal voting rules. Proof. Fix an arbitrary deterministic ordinal voting rule f ; as we explained earlier in Section 2, we can assume without loss of generality that f is Pareto efficient.
Parts (i) and (ii). Consider a general election with a set of districts
, and n 1 is an integer multiple of m. We enumerate the alternatives as M = {j 1 , ..., j m } and let a = j m−1 , b = j m . We will construct an ordinal preference profile such that there are k different district winners {a, b, c 3 , ..., c k }. Then, without loss of generality, one of these alternatives is selected as the winner of the general election.
We define the rankings and the valuation profile v of the voters as follows:
• The voters in district d 1 are partitioned into m sets S 1 , ..., S m of equal size n 1 /m. The voters in set S i have the ranking j i j i+1 ... j m j 1 ... j i−1 . Since each alternative appears exactly the same number of times in each position and since f is Pareto efficient, any alternative can be selected as the winner of d 1 ; thus, without loss of generality, we may assume that the winner is a. The valuations are such that the voters in set S i for i ∈ [m − 2] ∪ {m} have value 1 for alternative j i , while the voters in set S m−1 have value 1/m for all alternatives.
• All voters in district d 2 rank alternative b first and the other alternatives arbitrarily in the remaining positions. Clearly, since f is Pareto efficient, b is the winner of d 2 . The valuations are such that all voters have value 1 for b.
• For each ∈ {3, ..., k}, the agents in each of district d are partitioned into two sets of equal size. All voters in the first set rank alternative c first, alternative b second, and then the other alternatives arbitrarily. All voters in the second set rank alternative b first, alternative c second, and then the other alternatives arbitrarily. Given these rankings and by the fact that f is Pareto efficient, the winner of the district is either c or b. Without loss of generality, we assume that the tie is broken in favour of alternative c . The valuations are such that the voters in the first set have value 1/2 for c and b, while the voters in the second set have value 1 for b.
Given the above valuation profile, the optimal alternative is b, while the winner of the election may be a. Since
The bounds follow by setting n 1 = min d∈D n d and n 2 = max d∈D n d for unweighted elections, and n 1 = n 2 = n/k for symmetric districts.
Part (iii).
For the unrestricted case, consider a general election with k districts such that there is a district d * ∈ D with weight w d * > d∈D\{d * } w d , and n d * is an integer multiple of m. Since d * has so much weight, the winner of this district is the general election winner as well. We enumerate the alternatives as M = {j 1 , ..., j m } and let a = j m−1 , b = j m . We define rankings and the valuation profile v of the voters as follows:
• District d * : the voters are partitioned into m sets S 1 , ..., S m of equal size n d * /m. The voters in set S i have the ranking j i j i+1 ... j m j 1 ... j i−1 . Since each alternative appears exactly the same number of times in each position and since f is Pareto efficient, any alternative can be selected as the winner of d * ; thus, without loss of generality, we may assume that the winner is a. The valuations are such that the voters in set S i for i ∈ [m − 2] ∪ {m} have value 1 for alternative j i , while the voters in set S m−1 have value 1/m for all alternatives.
• District d ∈ D \ {d * }: all voters rank alternative b first and then the other alternatives arbitrarily. All voters have value 1 for b. Hence, b is the winner in all these districts.
The optimal alternative is b, while the election winner may be a. Since
the distortion is equal to
Experiments
Thus far, we have studied the worst-case effect of the partition of voters into districts on the distortion of voting rules. In this section, we further showcase this phenomenon experimentally by using real-world utility profiles that are drawn from the Jester dataset [Goldberg et al., 2001] , which consists of ratings of 100 different jokes in the interval [−10, 10] by approximately 70,000 users; this dataset has been used in a plethora of previous papers, including the seminal work of Boutilier et al. [2015] . Following their methodology, we build instances with a set of alternatives that consists of the eight most-rated jokes.
For various values of k, we execute 1000 independent simulations as follows: we select a random set of 100 users among the ones that evaluated all eight alternatives, rescale their ratings so that they are non-negative and satisfy the unit-sum assumption, and then divide them into k districts. For the partition into districts, we consider both random partitions as well as bad partitions in terms of distortion. For the construction of the latter, for each instance consisting of a specific value of k and a set of voters, we create 100 random partitions of the voters into k districts, simulate the general election (based on the voting rules we consider) and then keep the partition with maximum distortion.
We compare the average distortion of four rules: Range Voting, Plurality, Borda, and Harmonic. Borda and Harmonic are two well-known positional scoring rules defined by the scoring vectors (m − 1, m − 2, ..., 0) and (1, 1/2, ..., 1/m), respectively. According to these rules, each voter assigns points to the alternatives based on the positions she ranks them, and the alternative with the most points is the winner; Plurality can also be defined similarly by the scoring vector (1, 0, ..., 0). Fig. 1 depicts the results of our simulations for unweighted and weighted districts when the partition into districts is random and k ∈ {1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25}. As one can observe, the behaviour of the four voting rules is very similar in both cases, and it is evident that as the number of districts increases, the distortion increases as well. For instance, the distortion of Plurality increased by 3.71% for k = 5 compared to k = 1 (i.e., when there are no districts) and by 6.44% for k = 25; these values are similar for the other rules as well, although a bit lower. Table 1 contains the results of our simulations for unweighted and weighted districts when the partition into districts is bad (in terms of the distortion) and k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. As in the case of random districts, we can again observe that the distortion increases as k increases, but now the difference between the cases with districts (k ≥ 2) and without districts (k = 1) is more clear; the distortion is almost five times higher.
Best-case partitions via districting
In this section we turn out attention to a somewhat different setting. We assume that the k districts are not a priori defined, and instead we are free to decide the partition of the voters into the districts so as to minimize their effect on the distortion of the underlying voting rule; we refer to the process of partitioning the voters into k districts as k-districting. We consider symmetric districts, and start our analysis with the question of whether it is possible to define the districts so that the optimal alternative (i.e., the one that maximizes the social welfare of the voters) wins the general election when RV is used as the voting rule. Unfortunately, as we show with our next theorem, this is not always possible.
Theorem 6.1. For every k ≥ 2, there exists an instance such that no symmetric k-districting allows the optimal alternative to win the general election when RV is the voting rule.
Proof. Consider a general election with n+1 alternatives M = {a 1 , ..., a n , b} and let k be such that n/k is an integer for simplicity; then, each district must consist of exactly n/k voters. Let ε ∈ 0, 1 2(n+1) and let v be the valuation profile according to which voter i has value n n+k + ε for alternative a i and value k n+k − ε for alternative b; her value for the remaining alternatives is zero. Since SW(a i |v) = n n+k + ε for every i ∈ [n] and SW(b|v) = nk n+k − nε, alternative b is clearly the optimal alternative. However, observe that all possible sets of n/k voters that can be included together in a district cannot make b the winner of the district when the voting rule is RV. Indeed, the welfare of such a set of voters for b is only n n+k − nε k , while their welfare for the alternatives they rank first is n n+k . Therefore, there is no symmetric k-districting that can make b the winner of the general election with RV.
In fact, the instance used in the proof of Theorem 6.1 indicates that even the best-case distortion of RV may be at least k. We continue the bad news by showing that the problem of deciding whether it is possible to define the districts such that the optimal alternative wins the general election with RV is NP-hard for k = 2. The proof follows by a reduction from a constrained version of PARTITION.
Theorem 6.2. Deciding whether there is a symmetric 2-districting so that the optimal alternative is the winner of the general election when RV is the voting rule is NP-hard.
Proof. We show a reduction from a constrained version of PARTITION: C-PARTITION: Given a set of η positive integer numbers {x 1 , ..., x η }, find a partition of them into two sets of equal size and equal sum.
This version of PARTITION is known to be NP-hard (see problem SP12 in [Garey and Johnson, 1979] ). Before we construct the instance of our problem, we normalize the input numbers of the C-PARTITION instance by dividing with their sum. Hence, in what follows, we assume without loss of generality that the (now real) numbers {x 1 , ..., x η } sum up to 1 and the goal of C-PARTITION is to split the numbers into two sets of equal size such that the sum in each set is exactly 1/2; we also assume that each individual number is strictly less than 1/2, as otherwise C-PARTITION is easy.
Let ε be an infinitesimally small positive constant. We define a general election with n = η voters, m = 2n + 1 alternatives M = {a 1 , ..., a n , b 1 , ..., b n , c}, and valuation profile v such that voter i ∈ [n] has value 1/2 − ε for a i , value 1/2 + ε − x i for b i , value x i for c, and zero value for any other alternative. Since SW(a i |v) = 1/2 − ε, SW(b i |v) = 1/2 + ε − x i and SW(c|v) = i∈[n] x i = 1, the optimal alternative is c. Hence, the goal is to partition the voters into two districts of n/2 voters each such that the winner in both districts and therefore the necessary winner of the general election is c. This is possible if and only if the instance of C-PARTITION is a yes-instance so that the welfare of the voters in each district is 1/2 for c, slightly more than the welfare of the voters therein for the corresponding type-a alternatives.
We remark here that we have been unable to extend this intractability result to the case k ≥ 2. The main characteristic in the instance used in the proof of Theorem 6.2 is that the optimal alternative needs to win both districts in order to be a necessary winner of the general election. For higher values of k, winning all districts is not necessary; for instance, for k = 3, an alternative needs to win only two districts. Therefore, currently it is not very clear how a reduction from a strongly NP-hard problem (say 3-PARTITION) for k ≥ 2 would work.
In contrast to the above result for the optimal alternative and RV, we next show that we can always find a symmetric k-districting so that the PV winner without districts can be made the winner of the general election when PV is used as the voting rule within the districts. Since the voting rule is PV, we assume that the only knowledge which we can leverage in order to define the districts is about the favourite alternatives of the voters (i.e., for each voter, we know the alternative she approves).
Theorem 6.3. For any k ≥ 2, there always exists a symmetric k-districting that allows the winner of PV without districts to win the general election with k districts, and this districting can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary instance with set of alternatives M, set of voters N , and valuation profile v, which induces the ordinal profile Π v . To simplify our discussion, we assume that n/k is an integer. For every alternative j ∈ M, let N (j) be the set of voters that rank j at the first position according to Π v , and set n(j) = |N (j)|. Now, we create k hypothetical districts such that each district consists of n(j) k voters from set N (j) for every j ∈ M. If all fractions n(j) k are integer numbers, then this clearly defines a partition of the voters into symmetric districts and the winner of each district (and therefore of the general election) is the PV winner without districts. In case this is not true however, in order to create a valid partition we do the following: for each j ∈ M we place n(j) k voters of N (j) in the first k 2 districts and n(j) k voters of N (j) in the remaining districts; this is obviously a valid partition. It is easy to verify that the Plurality winner is the winner of at least k 2 districts and hence the winner of the general election.
We conclude this section by showing that the above result for PV is essentially tight. This follows by the existence of instances where any partition of the voters into any number of districts yields distortion for the general election with PV that is asymptotically equal to the distortion of PV without districts.
Theorem 6.4. There exist instances where any symmetric districting yields distortion gdist(PV) = Ω(m 2 ).
Proof. Consider a general election with m alternatives M = {a 1 , ..., a m }, n = m voters and the following information about the preferences of the voters: voter i approves alternative a i . Since all alternatives are approved by a single voter, no matter the partition of the voters into districts, the winner of the general election can be any alternative. Let x = a w be the winner of the election, and let y = a o be some other alternative with o = w. We define the following valuation profile v for the voters:
• Voter w has value 1 m for all alternatives;
• Voter o has value 1 for alternative y;
• Voter i ∈ {w, o} has value Observe that even if we have access to the whole valuation profile v, since the winner is selected to be the alternative with the most approval votes and each alternative is approved by only one voter, there is no way to define districts and avoid the possibility of alternative x being elected as the winner.
Conclusion and possible extensions
In this paper, we have initiated the study of the distortion of distributed voting. We showcased the effect of districting on the social welfare both theoretically from a worst-and a best-case perspective, as well as experimentally using real-world data. Even though we have painted an almost complete picture, our work reveals many interesting avenues for future research. In terms of our results, possibly the most obvious open question is whether we can strengthen the weak intractability result of Theorem 6.2 using a reduction from a strongly NP-hard problem, and also extend it to k ≥ 2. Moving away from the unconstrained normalized setting that we considered here, it would be very interesting to analyze the effect of districts in the case of metric preferences [Anshelevich et al., 2018] , a setting that has received considerable attention in the recent related literature on the distortion of voting rules without districts [Anshelevich and Postl, 2017; Feldman et al., 2016; Goel et al., 2018 Goel et al., , 2017 Gross et al., 2017; Pierczynski and Skowron, 2019] . Other important extensions include settings in which the partitioning of voters into districts is further constrained by natural factors such as geological locations [Lewenberg et al., 2017] or connectivity in social networks [Lesser et al.] .
